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ON BEING SANE IN INSANE PLACESt
D. L. Rosenhan*
INTRODUCTION
If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them?
The question is neither capricious nor itself insane. However
much we may be personally convinced that we can tell the normal
from the abnormal, the evidence is simply not compelling. It is
commonplace, for example, to read about murder trials wherein
eminent psychiatrists for the defense are contradicted by equally
eminent psychiatrists for the prosecution on the matter of the
defendant's sanity. More generally, there are a great deal of con-
flicting data on the reliability, utility, and meaning of such terms as
"sanity," "insanity, .... mental illness," and "schizophrenia."'  Fi-
nally, as early as 1934, Benedict suggested that normality and ab-
normality are not universal.2  What is viewed as normal in one cul-
ture may be seen as quite aberrant in another. Thus, notions of
t This article was originally published in SCIENCE, Jan. 19, 1973, vol. 179
at 250, copyright 1973 by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. The article is reprinted here with the permission of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and the author, Dr. D.L. Rosen-
han.
* B.A., Yeshiva College, 1951; M.A., Columbia University, 1953; Ph.D.,
Columbia University, 1958. The author is professor of psychology and law at
Stanford University, Stanford, California. Portions of these data were presented
to colloquims of the psychology departments at the University of California at
Berkeley and at Santa Barbara; University of Arizona, Tucson; and Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
1. P. Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. OF ABNORMAL
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 272 (1949); A.T. Beck, Reliability of Psychiatric Diag-
nosis: A Critique of Systematic Studies, 119 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 210 (1962);
A.T. Boisen, Types of Dementia Praecox-A Study in Psychiatric Classifica-
tion, 1 PSYCIATRY 233 (1938); N. Kreitman, The Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis, 107 J. MENT. Sci. 876 (1961); N. Kreitman, P. Sainsbury, J. Mor-
risey, J. Towers, J. Scrivener, The Reliability of Psychiatric Assessment: An
Analysis, 107 J. MENT. Sci. 887 (1961); H.O. Schmidt and C.P. Fonda, The
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A New Look, 52 J. OF ABNORMAL AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 262 (1956); W. Seeman, Psychiatric Diagnosis: An Investi-
gation of Interperson Reliability After Didactic Instruction, 118 J. OF NERvous
& MENTAL DIsEASE 541 (1953). For an analysis of these artifacts and sum-
maries of the disputes, see L. Phillips and J.G. Draguns, -, 22 ANNu. REv. OF
PSYCHOL. 447 (1971); J. Zubin, Classification of The Behavior Disorders, 18
ANNU. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 373 (1967).
2. R. Benedict, Anthropology & The Abnormal, 10 J. GENERAL PSYCHOL.
59 (1934).
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normality and abnormality may not be quite as accurate as people
believe they are.
To raise questions regarding normality and abnormality is in
no way to question the fact that some behaviors are deviant or odd.
Murder is deviant. So, too, are hallucinations. Nor does raising
such questions deny the existence of the personal anguish that is
often associated with "mental illness." Anxiety and depression
exist. Psychological suffering exists. But normality and abnor-
mality, sanity and insanity, and the diagnoses that flow from them
may be less substantive than many believe them to be.
At its heart, the question of whether the sane can be distin-
guished from the insane (and whether degrees of insanity can be
distinguished from each other) is a simple matter: do the salient
characteristics that lead to diagnoses reside in the patients them-
selves or in the environments and contexts in which observers find
them? From Bleuler, through Kretchmer, through the formu-
lators of the recently revised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
the American Psychiatric Association, the belief has been strong
that patients present symptoms, that those symptoms can be cate-
gorized, and, implicitly, that the sane are distinguishable from the
insane. More recently, however, this belief has been questioned.
Based in part on theoretical and anthropological considerations,
but also on philosophical, legal, and therapeutic ones, the view has
grown that psychological categorization of mental illness is useless
at best and downright harmful, misleading, and pejorative at worst.
Psychiatric diagnoses, in this view, are in the minds of the observers
and are not valid summaries of characteristics displayed by the
observed.8
Gains can be made in deciding which of these is more nearly
accurate by getting normal people (that is, people who do not have,
and have never suffered, symptoms of serious psychiatric disorders)
3. See H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE(1963); B.M. BRAGINSKY, D.D. BRAGINSKY, & K. RING, METHODS OF MADNESS:
THE MENTAL HOSPITAL AS A LAST RESORT (1969); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS(1961) [hereinafter cited as GOFFMAN]; E. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC
PLACES (1964); R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: A STUDY OF SANITY AND MAD-
NESS (1960); T.J. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY(1966) [hereinafter cited as SCHEFF]; T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY(1963); T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY
OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961); G.M. Crocetti & P.V. Lemkau, On Rejection
of the Mentally Ill, 30 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 577 (1965); D.L. Phillips, Rejec-
tion: A Possible Consequence of Seeking Help for Mental Disorders, 28 AM.
SOCIOL. REV. 963 (1963); T.R. Sarbin, Schizophrenia Is a Myth, Born of
Metaphor, Meaningless, 6 PSYCHOL. TODAY June 12, 1972 at 18; E. Schur,
Reactions to Deviance: A Critical Assessment, 75 AM. J. OF SOCIAL. 309(1969). For a critique of some of these views, see W.R. Gove, Societal
Reaction as an Explanation of Mental Illness: An Evaluation, 35 AM. SOCIOL.
REV. 873 (1970).
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admitted to psychiatric hospitals and then determining whether
they were discovered to be sane and, if so, how. If the sanity of
such pseudo-patients were always detected, there would be prima
facie evidence that a sane individual can be distinguished from the
insane context in which he is found. Normality (and presumably
abnormality) is distinct enough that it can be recognized wherever
it occurs, for it is carried within the person. If, on the other hand,
the sanity of the pseudopatients were never discovered, serious
difficulties would arise for those who support traditional modes of
psychiatric diagnosis. Given that the hospital staff was not incom-
petent, that the pseudopatient had been behaving as sanely as he
had been outside of the hospital, and that it had never been pre-
viously suggested that he belonged in a psychiatric hospital, such
an unlikely outcome would support the view that psychiatric
diagnosis betrays little about the patient but much about the en-
vironment in which an observer finds him.
This article describes such an experiment. Eight sane people
gained secret admission to 12 different hospitals. 4 Their diagnostic
experiences constitute the data of the first part of this article; the
remainder is devoted to a description of their experiences in psy-
chiatric institutions. Too few psychiatrists and psychologists, even
those who have worked in such hospitals, know what the experience
is like. They rarely talk about it with former patients, perhaps
because they distrust information coming from the previously in-
sane. Those who have worked in psychiatric hospitals are likely to
have adapted so thoroughly to the settings that they are insensitive
to the impact of that experience. And while there have been oc-
casional reports of researchers who submitted themselves to psy-
chiatric hospitalization, 5 these researchers have commonly remained
in the hospitals for short periods of time, often with the knowledge
of the hospital staff. It is difficult to know the extent to which
they were treated like patients or like research colleagues. Never-
theless, their reports about the inside of the psychiatric hospital have
been valuable. This article extends those efforts.
4. Data from a ninth pseudopatient are not incorporated in this report
because, although his sanity went undetected, he falsified aspects of his per-
sonal history, including his marital status and parental relationships. His ex-
perimental behaviors therefore were not identical to those of the other pseudo-
patients.
5. A. BARRY, BELLEVUE IS A STATE OF MIND (1971); I. BELKNAP, HUMAN
PROBLEMS OF A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL (1956); W. Caudill, F.C. Redlich,
H.R. Gilmore & E.B. Brody, Social Structure and Interaction Processes on a
Psychiatric Ward, 22 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSyCHIATRY 314 (1952); A.R. Goldman,
R.H. Bohr & T.A. Steinberg, On Posing as Mental Patients: Reminiscences and
Recommendations, I PROF. PSYCHOL. 427 (1970); 1 RocH- REPORT No. 13 at
8 (1971).
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PSEUDOPATIENTS AND THEIR SETTINGS
The eight pseudopatients were a varied group. One was a
psychology graduate student in his 20's. The remaining seven
were older and "established." Among them were three psycholo-
gists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, and a housewife.
Three pseudopatients were women, five were men. All of them
employed pseudonyms, lest their alleged diagnoses embarrass them
later. Those who were in mental health professions alleged another
occupation in order to avoid the special attentions that might be ac-
corded by staff, as a matter of courtesy or caution, to ailing col-
leagues.6 With the exception of myself (I was the first pseudo-
patient and my presence was known to the hospital administrator
and chief psychologist and, so far as I can tell, to them alone),
the presence of pseudopatients and the nature of the research pro-
gram was not known to the hospital staffs. 7
The settings were similarly varied. In order to generalize the
findings, admission into a variety of hospitals was sought. The 12
hospitals in the sample were located in five different states on
the East and West coasts. Some were old and shabby, some were
quite new. Some were research-oriented, others not. Some had
good staff-patient ratios, others were quite understaffed. Only
one was a strictly private hospital. All of the others were supported
by state or federal funds, or, in one instance, by university funds.
After calling the hospital for an appointment, the pseudo-
patient arrived at the admissions office complaining that he had
been hearing voices. Asked what the voices said, he replied that
they were often unclear, but as far as he could tell they said
"empty, .... hollow," and "thud." The voices were unfamiliar and
were of the same sex as the pseudo-patient. The choice of these
symptoms was occasioned by their apparent similarity to existential
6. Beyond the personal difficulties that the pseudopatient is likely to
experience in the hospital, there are legal and social ones that, combined, re-quire considerable attention before entry. For example, once admitted to apsychiatric institution, it is difficult, if not impossible, to be discharged on
short notice, state law to the contrary notwithstanding. I was not sensitive to
these difficulties at the outset of the project, nor to the personal and situa-
tional emergencies that can arise, but later a writ of habeas corpus was pre-
pared for each of the entering pseudopatients and an attorney was kept "on
call" during every hospitalization. I am grateful to John Kaplan and Robert
Bartels for legal advice and assistance in these matters.7. However distasteful such concealment is, it was a necessary first step
to examining these questions. Without concealment, there would have been
no way to know how valid these experiences were; nor was there any way ofknowing whether whatever detections occurred were a tribute to the diagnostic
acumen of the staff or to the hospital's rumor network. Obviously, since my
concerns are general ones that cut across. individual hospitals and staffs, I have
respected their anonymity and have eliminated clues that might lead to their
identification.
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symptoms. Such symptoms are alleged to arise from painful con-
cerns about the perceived meaninglessness of one's fife. It is as
if the hallucinating person were saying, "My life is empty and
hollow." The choice of these symptoms was also determined by
the absence of a single report of existential psychoses in the litera-
ture.
Beyond alleging the symptoms and falsifying name, vocation,
and employment, no further alterations of person, history, or cir-
cumstances were made. The significant events of the pseudo-
patient's life history were presented as they had actually occurred.
Relationships with parents and siblings, with spouse and children,
with people at work and in school, consistent with the aforemen-
tioned exceptions, were described as they were or had been. Frus-
trations and upsets were described along with joys and satisfactions.
These facts are important to remember. If anything, they strongly
biased the subsequent results in favor of detecting sanity, since none
of their histories or current behaviors were seriously pathological
in any way.
Immediately upon admission to the psychiatric ward, the
pseudopatient ceased simulating any symptoms of abnormality. In
some cases, there was a brief period of mild nervousness and
anxiety, since none of the pseudopatients really believed that they
would be admitted so easily. Indeed, their shared fear was that
they would be immediately exposed as frauds and greatly em-
barrassed. Moreover, many of them had never visited a psychiatric
ward; even those who had, nevertheless had some genuine fears
about what might happen to them. Their nervousness, then, was
quite appropriate to the novelty of the hospital setting, and it abated
rapidly.
Apart from that short-lived nervousness, the pseudopatient
behaved on the ward as he "normally" behaved. The pseudo-
patient spoke to patients and staff as he might ordinarily. Because
there is uncommonly little to do on a psychiatric ward, he attempted
to engage others in conversation. When asked by staff how he
was feeling, he indicated that he was fine, that he no longer experi-
enced symptoms. He responded to instructions from attendants,
to calls for medication (which was not swallowed), and to dining-
hall instructions. Beyond such activities as were available to him
on the admissions ward, he spent his time writing down his observa-
tions about the ward, its patients, and the staff. Initially these notes
were written "secretly," but as it soon became clear that no one
much cared, they were subsequently written on standard tablets of
paper in such public places as the dayroom. No secret was made
of these activities.
The pseudopatient, very much as a true psychiatric patient,
1973]
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entered a hospital with no foreknowledge of when he would be
discharged. Each was told that he would have to get out by his
own devices, essentially by convincing the staff that he was sane.
The psychological stresses associated with hospitalization were con-
siderable, and all but one of the pseudopatients desired to be dis-
charged almost immediately after being admitted. They were,
therefore, motivated not only to behave sanely, but to be paragons
of cooperation. That their behavior was in no way disruptive is
confirmed by nursing reports, which have been obtained on most
of the patients. These reports uniformly indicate that the patients
were "friendly, .... cooperative," and "exhibited no abnormal indica-
tions."
THE NORMAL ARE NOT DETECTABLY SANE
Despite their public "show" of sanity, the pseudopatients were
never detected. Admitted, except in one case, with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia,8 each was discharged with a diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia "in remission." The label "in remission" should in no way
be dismissed as a formality, for at no time during any hospitaliza-
tion had any question been raised about any pseudopatient's simula-
tion. Nor are there any indications in the hospital records that
the pseudopatient's status was suspect. Rather, the evidence is
strong that, once labeled schizophrenic, the pseudopatient was stuck
with that label. If the pseudopatient was to be discharged, he must
naturally be "in remission"; but he was not sane, nor, in the institu-
tion's view, had he ever been sane.
The uniform failure to recognize sanity cannot be attributed to
the quality of the hospitals, for, although there were considerable
variations among them, several are considered excellent. Nor can
it be alleged that there was simply not enough time to observe the
pseudopatients. Length of hospitalization ranged from 7 to 52
days, with an average of 19 days. The pseudopatients were not,
in fact, carefully observed, but this failure clearly speaks more to
traditions within psychiatric hospitals than to lack of opportunity.
Finally, it cannot be said that the failure to recognize the
pseudopatients' sanity was due to the fact that they were not be-
having sanely. While there was clearly some tension present in
all of them, their daily visitors could detect no serious behavioral
consequences-nor, indeed, could other patients. It was quite
8. Interestingly, of the 12 admissions, 11 were diagnosed as schizophrenic
and one, with the identical symptomatology, as manic-depressive psychosis.
This diagnosis has a more favorable prognosis, and it was given by the only
private hospital in our sample. On the relations between social class and psy-
chiatric diagnosis, see A. DEB. HOLLINGSHEAD & F.C. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS
AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A COMMUNITY STUDY (1958).
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common for the patients to "detect" the pseudopatients' sanity.
During the first three hospitalizations, when accurate counts were
kept, 35 of a total of 118 patients on the admissions ward voiced
their suspicions, some vigorously. "You're not crazy. You're a
journalist, or a professor [referring to the continual note-taking].
You're checking up on the hospital." While most of the patients
were reassured by the pseudopatient's insistence that he had been
sick before he came in but was fine now, some continued to believe
that the pseudopatient was sane throughout his hospitalization.9
The fact that the patients often recognized normality when staff
did not raises important questions.
Failure to detect sanity during the course of hospitalization
may be due to the fact that physicians operate with a strong bias
toward what statisticians call the type 2 error. 10 This is to say
that physicians are more inclined to call a healthy person sick (a
false positive, type 2) than a sick person healthy (a false negative,
type 1). The reasons for this are not hard to find: it is clearly
more dangerous to misdiagnose illness than health. Better to err
on the side of caution, to suspect illness even among the healthy.
But what holds for medicine does not hold equally well for
psychiatry. Medical illnesses, while unfortunate, are not commonly
pejorative. Psychiatric diagnoses, on the contrary, carry with them
personal, legal, and social stigmas. 1 It was therefore important
to see whether the tendency toward diagnosing the sane insane
could be reversed. The following experiment was arranged at a
research and teaching hospital whose staff had heard these findings
but doubted that such an error could occur in their hospital. The
staff was informed that at some time during the following 3 months,
one or more pseudopatients would attempt to be admitted into the
psychiatric hospital. Each staff member was asked to rate each
patient who presented himself at admissions or on the ward accord-
ing to the likelihood that the patient was a pseudopatient. A 10-
point scale was used, with a 1 and 2 reflecting high confidence that
the patient was a pseudopatient.
9. It is possible, of course, that patients have quite broad latitudes in
diagnosis and therefore are inclined to call many people. sane, even those
whose behavior is patently aberrant. However, although we have no hard data
on this matter, it was our distinct impression that this was not the case. In
many instances, patients not only singled us out for attention, but came to
imitate our behavior and styles.
10. See SCHEFF, supra note 3.
11. H.E. FREEMAN & O.G. SIMMONs, THE MENTAL PATIENT COMES HoME
(1963); J. Cumming & E. Cumming, On the Stigma of Mental Illness, 1 COM-
MUNITY MENT. HEALTH J. 135 (1965); A. Farina & K. Ring, The Influence of
Perceived Mental illness on Interpersonal Relations, 70 J. OF ABNORM. PSYCHOL.
47 (1965); W.J. Johannsen, Attitudes Toward Mental Patients: A Review of
Empirical Research, 53 MENT. HYGIENE 218 (1969); A.S. Linsky, -, 5 Soc.
PSYcHIAT. 166 (1970).
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Judgments were obtained on 193 patients who were admitted
for psychiatric treatment. All staff who had had sustained contact
with or primary responsibility for the patient-attendants, nurses,
psychiatrists, physicians, and psychologists-were asked to makejudgments. Forty-one patients were alleged, with high confidence,
to be pseudopatients by at least one member of the staff. Twenty-
three were considered suspect by at least one psychiatrist. Nine-
teen were suspected by one psychiatrist and one other staff member.
Actually, no genuine pseudopatient (at least from my group) pre-
sented himself during this period.
The experiment is instructive. It indicates that the tendency
to designate sane people as insane can be reversed when the stakes(in this case, prestige and diagnostic acumen) are high. But what
can be said of the 19 people who were suspected of being "sane"
by one psychiatrist and another staff member? Were these people
truly "sane," or was it rather the case that in the course of avoiding
the type 2 error the staff tended to make more errors of the first
sort-calling the crazy "sane"? There is no way of knowing. But
one thing is certain: any diagnostic process that lends itself so
readily to massive errors of this sort cannot be a very reliable one.
THE STICKINESS OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC LABELS
Beyond the tendency to call the healthy sick-a tendency that
accounts better for diagnostic behavior on admission than it does
for such behavior after a lengthy period of exposure-the data
speak to the massive role of labeling in psychiatric assessment.
Having once been labeled schizophrenic, there is nothing the
pseudopatient can do to overcome the tag. The tag profoundly
colors others' perceptions of him and his behavior.
From one viewpoint, these data are hardly surprising, for it
has long been known that elements are given meaning by the con-
text in which they occur. Gestalt psychology made this point vig-
orously, and Asch"2 demonstrated that there are "central" person-
ality traits (such as "warm" versus "cold") which are so powerful
that they markedly color the meaning of other information in form-
ing an impression of a given personality. 13 "Insane," "schizo-
phrenic," "manic-depressive," and "crazy" are probably among the
most powerful of such central traits. Once a person is designated
12. S.E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); S.E. Asch, Forming Impres-
sions of Personality, 41 J. OF ABNORM. SoC. PSYCHOL. 258 (1946).
13. See also J.S. Bruner & R. Tagiuri, 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
634-654 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954); J.S. Bruner, D. Shapiro & R. Tagiuri, PER-
CEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 277-288 (R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo eds.
1958); I.N. Mensch & J. Wishner, Asch on "Forming Impressions of Personal-
ity": Further Evidence, 16 J. OF PERSONALITY 188 (1947).
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abnormal, all of his other behaviors and characteristics are colored
by that label. Indeed, that label is so powerful that many of the
pseudopatients' normal behaviors were overlooked entirely or pro-
foundly misinterpreted. Some examples may clarify this issue.
Earlier I indicated that there were no changes in the pseudo-
patient's personal history and current status beyond those of name,
employment, and, where necessary, vocation. Otherwise, a veridi-
cal description of personal history and circumstances was offered.
Those circumstances were not psychotic. How were they made
consonant with the diagnosis of psychosis? Or were those diag-
noses modified in such a way as to bring them into accord with the
circumstances of the pseudopatient's life, as described by him?
As far as I can determine, diagnoses were in no way affected
by the relative health of the circumstances of a pseudopatient's life.
Rather, the reverse occurred: the perception of his circumstances
was shaped entirely by the diagnosis. A clear example of such
translation is found in the case of a pseudopatient who had had a
close relationship with his mother but was rather remote from his
father during his early childhood. During adolescence and beyond,
however, his father became a close friend, while his relationship
with his mother cooled. His present relationship with his wife was
characteristically close and warm. Apart from occasional angry ex-
changes, friction was minimal. The children had rarely been
spanked. Surely there is nothing especially pathological about such
a history. Indeed, many readers may see a similar pattern in their
own experiences, with no markedly deleterious consequences. Ob-
serve, however, how such a history was translated in the psycho-
pathological context, this from the case summary prepared after the
patient was discharged.
This white 39-year-old male . . . manifests a long his-
tory of considerable ambivalence in close relationships, which
begins in early childhood. A warm relationship with his
mother cools during his adolescence. A distant relationship
to his father is described as becoming very intense. Affective
stability is absent. His attempts to control emotionality with
his wife and children are punctuated by angry outbursts and,
in the case of the children, spankings. And while he says
that he has several good friends, one senses considerable am-
bivalence embedded in those relationships also ...
The facts of the case were unintentionally distorted by the staff
to achieve consistency with a popular theory of the dynamics of a
schizophrenic reaction. 14  Nothing of an ambivalent nature had
14. For an example of a similar self-fulfilling prophecy, in this instance
dealing with the "central" trait of intelligence, see R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOB-
SON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968).
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been described in relations with parents, spouse, or friends. To
the extent that ambivalence could be inferred, it was probably not
greater than is found in all human relationships. It is true the
pseudopatient's relationships with his parents changed over time,
but in the ordinary context that would hardly be remarkable-in-
deed, it might very well be expected. Clearly, the meaning ascribed
to his verbalizations (that is, ambivalence, affective instability) was
determined by the diagnosis: schizophrenia. An entirely different
meaning would have been ascribed if it were known that the man
was "normal."
All pseudopatients took extensive notes publicly. Under or-
dinary circumstances, such behavior would have raised questions in
the minds of observers, as, in fact, it did among patients. Indeed,
it seemed so certain that the notes would elicit suspicion that elab-
orate precautions were taken to remove them from the ward each
day. But the precautions proved needless. The closest any staff
member came to questioning these notes occurred when one pseudo-
patient asked his physician what kind of medication he was receiv-
ing and began to write down the response. "You needn't write it,"
he was told gently. "If you have trouble remembering, just ask me
again."
If no questions were asked of the pseudopatients, how was
their writing interpreted? Nursing records for three patients indi-
cate that the writing was seen as an aspect of their pathological
behavior. "Patient engages in writing behavior" was the daily
nursing comment on one of the pseudopatients who was never
questioned about his writing. Given that the patient is in the hos-
pital, he must be psychologically disturbed. And given that he is
disturbed, continuous writing must be a behavioral manifestation of
that disturbance, perhaps a subset of the compulsive behaviors that
are sometimes correlated with schizophrenia.
One tacit characteristic of psychiatric diagnosis is that it lo-
cates the sources of aberration within the individual and only rarely
within the complex of stimuli that surrounds him. Consequently,
behaviors that are stimulated by the environment are commonly
misattributed to the patient's disorder. For example, one kindly
nurse found a pseudopatient pacing the long hospital corridors.
"Nervous, Mr. X?" she asked. "No, bored," he said.
The notes kept by pseudopatients are full of patient behaviors
that were misinterpreted by well-intentioned staff. Often enough,
a patient would go "berserk" because he had, wittingly or unwitt-
ingly, been mistreated by, say, an attendant. A nurse coming upon
the scene would rarely inquire even cursorily into the environmental
stimuli of the patient's behavior. Rather, she assumed that his
[Vol. 13
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upset derived from his pathology, not from his present interactions
with other staff members. Occasionally, the staff might assume
that the patient's family (especially when they had recently visited)
or other patients had stimulated the outburst. But never were the
staff found to assume that one of themselves or the structure of
the hospital had anything to do with a patient's behavior. One
psychiatrist pointed to a group of patients who were sitting outside
the cafeteria entrance half an hour before lunchtime. To a group
of young residents he indicated that such behavior was characteristic
of the oral-acquisitive nature of the syndrome. It seemed not to
occur to him that there were very few things to anticipate in a
psychiatric hospital besides eating.
A psychiatric label has a life and an influence of its own.
Once the impression has been formed that the patient is schizo-
phrenic, the expectation is that he will continue to be schizophrenic.
When a sufficient amount of time has passed, during which the
patient has done nothing bizarre, he is considered to be in remission
and available for discharge. But the label endures beyond dis-
charge, with the unconfirmed expectation that he will behave as
a schizophrenic again. Such labels, conferred by mental health
professionals, are as influential on the patient as they are on his
relatives and friends, and it should not surprise anyone that the
diagnosis acts on all of them as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even-
tually, the patient himself accepts the diagnosis, with all of its
surplus meanings and expectations, and behaves accordingly.' 5
The inferences to be made from these matters are quite simple.
Much as Zigler and Phillips have demonstrated that there is enor-
mous overlap in the symptoms presented by patients who have been
variously diagnosed,' 6 so there is enormous overlap in the behaviors
of the sane and the insane. The sane are not "sane" all of the time.
We lose our tempers "for no good reason." We are occasionally
depressed or anxious, again for no good reason. And we may find
it difficult to get along with one or another person-again for no
reason that we can specify. Similarly, the insane are not always
insane. Indeed, it was the impression of the pseudopatients while
living with them that they were sane for long periods of time-that
the bizarre behaviors upon which their diagnoses were allegedly
predicated constituted only a small fraction of their total behavior.
If it makes no sense to label ourselves permanently depressed on
the basis of an occasional depression, then it takes better evidence
15. See SCHEFF, supra note 3.
16. E. Zigler & L. Phillips, Psychiatric Diagnosis and Symptomatology,
63 J. oF ABRNORM AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 69 (1961). See also R.K. Freudenberg
& J.P. Robertson, Symptoms in Relation to Psychiatric Diagnosis and Treat-
ment, 76 A.M.A. ARCH. OF NEUROL. AND PSYCHIATRY 14 (1956).
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than is presently available to label all patients insane or schizo-
phrenic on the basis of bizarre behaviors or cognitions. It seems
more useful, as Mische17 has pointed out, to limit our discussions
to behaviors, the stimuli that provoke them, and their correlates.
It is not known why powerful impressions of personality traits,
such as "crazy" or "insane," arise. Conceivably, when the origins
of and stimuli that give rise to a behavior are remote or unknown, or
when the behavior strikes us as immutable, trait labels regarding the
behaver arise. When, on the other hand, the origins and stimuli
are known and available, discourse is limited to the behavior itself.
Thus, I may hallucinate because I am sleeping, or I may hallucinate
because I have ingested a peculiar drug. These are termed sleep-
induced hallucinations, or dreams, and drug-induced hallucinations,
respectively. But when the stimuli to my hallucinations are un-
known, that is called craziness, or schizophrenia-as if that infer-
ence were somehow as illuminating as the others.
THE EXPERIENCE OF PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALIZATION
The term "mental illness" is of recent origin. It was coined
by people who were humane in their inclinations and who wanted
very much to raise the station of (and the public's sympathies
toward) the psychologically disturbed from that of witches and
"crazies" to one that was akin to the physically ill. And they were
at least partially successful, for the treatment of the mentally ill has
improved considerably over the years. But while treatment has im-
proved, it is doubtful that people really regard the mentally ill in
the same way that they view the physically ill. A broken leg is
something one recovers from, but mental illness allegedly endures
forever.' 8 A broken leg does not threaten the observer, but a crazy
schizophrenic? There is by now a host of evidence that attitudes
toward the mentally ill are characterized by fear, hostility, alloof-
ness, suspicion, and dread.' 9 The mentally ill are society's lepers.
That such attitudes infect the general population is perhaps
not surprising, only upsetting. But that they affect the profession-
als-attendants, nurses, physicians, phychologists, and social work-
ers-who treat and deal with the mentally ill is more disconcerting,
both because such attitudes are self-evidently pernicious and be-
17. W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968).
18. The most recent and unfortunate instance of this tenet is that of Senator
Thomas Eagleton.
19. J.C. NUNNALLY, JR., POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH(1961); T.R. Sarbin & J.C. Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes
of the Public Toward Mental Illness, 35 J. OF CONSULT. AND CLIN. PSYCHOL.
159 (1970); T.R. Sarbin, On the Futility of the Proposition that Some People
be Labeled "Mentally Ill," 31 J. OF CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 447 (1967).
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cause they are unwitting. Most mental health professionals would
insist that they are sympathetic toward the mentally ill, that they
are neither avoidant nor hostile. But it is more likely that an ex-
quisite ambivalence characterizes their relations with psychiatric
patients, such that their avowed impulses are only part of their
entire attitude. Negative attitudes are there too and can easily be
detected. Such attitudes should not surprise us. They are the
natural offspring of the labels patients wear and the places in which
they are found.
Staff-Initiated Contact with Patients
Consider the structure of the typical psychiatric hospital.
Staff and patients are strictly segregated. Staff have their own
living space, including their dining facilities, bathrooms, and as-
sembly places. The glassed quarters that contain the professional
staff, which the pseudopatients came to call "the cage," sit out on
every dayroom. The staff emerge primarily for caretaking pur-
poses-to give medication, to conduct a therapy or group meeting,
to instruct or reprimand a patient. Otherwise, staff keep to them-
selves, almost as if the disorder that afflicts their charges is some-
how catching.
So much is patient-staff segregation the rule that, for four
public hospitals in which an attempt was made to measure the de-
gree to which staff and patients mingle, it was necessary to use
"time out of the staff cage" as the operational measure. While it
was not the case that all time spent out of the cage was spent ming-
ling with patients (attendants, for example, would occasionally
emerge to watch television in the dayroom), it was the only way in
which one could gather reliable data on time for measuring.
The average amount of time spent by attendants outside of the
cage was 11.3 percent (range, 3 to 52 percent). This figure does
not represent only time spent mingling with patients, but also in-
cludes time spent on such chores as folding laundry, supervising
patients while they shave, directing ward cleanup, and sending pa-
tients to off-ward activities. It was the relatively rare attendant
who spent time talking with patients or playing games with them.
It proved impossible to obtain a "percent mingling time" for nurses,
since the amount of time they spent out of the cage was too brief.
Rather, we counted instances of emergence from the cage. On
the average, daytime nurses emerged from the cage 11.5 times per
shift, including instances when they left the ward entirely (range, 4
to 39 times). Late afternoon and night nurses were even less
available, emerging on the average 9.4 times per shift (range, 4 to
41 times). Data on early morning nurses, who arrived usually
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after midnight and departed at 8 a.m., are not available because
patients were asleep during most of this period.
Physicians, especially psychiatrists, were even less available.
They were rarely seen on the wards. Quite commonly, they would
be seen only when they arrived and departed, with the remaining
time being spent in their offices or in the cage. On the average,
physicians emerged on the ward 6.7 times per day (range, 1 to 17
times). It proved difficult to make an accurate estimate in this
regard, since physicians often maintained hours that allowed them
to come and go at different times.
The hierarchical organization of the psychiatric hospital has
been commented on before,2" but the latent meaning of that kind
of organization is worth noting again. Those with the most power
have least to do with patients, and those with the least power are
most involved with them. Recall, however, that the acquisition of
role-appropriate behaviors occurs mainly through the observation
of others, with the most powerful having the most influence. Con-
sequently, it is understandable that attendants not only spend more
time with patients than do any other members of the staff-that is
required by their station in the hierarchy-but also, insofar as they
learn from their superiors' behavior, spend as little time with
patients as they can. Attendants are seen mainly in the cage, which
is where the models, the action, and the power are.
Patient-Initiated Contact With Staff
I turn now to a different set of studies, these dealing with staff
response to patient-initiated contact. It has long been known that
the amount of time a person spends with you can be an index of
your significance to him. If he initiates and maintains eye con-
tact, there is reason to believe that he is considering your requests
and needs. If he pauses to chat or actually stops and talks, there
is added reason to infer that he is individuating you. In four
hospitals, the pseudopatient approached the staff member with a
request which took the following form: "Pardon me, Mr. [or Dr.
or Mrs.] X, could you tell me when I will be eligible for grounds
privileges?" (or ". . . when I will be presented at the staff
meeting?" or ". . . when I am likely to be discharged?"). While
the content of the question varied according to the appropriateness
of the target and the pseudopatient's (apparent) current needs the
form was always a courteous and relevant request for information.
Care was taken never to approach a particular member of the staff
more than once a day, lest the staff member become suspicious or
20. A.H. STANTON & M.S. SCHWARTZ, THE MENTAL HOSPITAL: A STUDY OF
INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS AND TREATMENT (1954).
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irritated. In examining these data, remember that the behavior of
the pseudopatients was neither bizarre nor disruptive. One could
indeed engage in good conversation with them.
The data for these experiments are shown in Table 1, sep-
arately for physicians (column 1) and for nurses and attendants
(column 2). Minor differences between these four institutions
were overwhelmed by the degree to which staff avoided continuing
contacts that patients had initiated. By far, their most common
response consisted of either a brief response to the question, offered
while they were "on the move" and with head averted, or no re-
sponse at all.
TABLE 1.
Self-initiated contact by pseudopatients with psychiatrists and nurses and
attendants, compared to contact with other groups.
University University
Psychiatric campus medical center
hospitals (nonmedical) Physicians
(6)
Contact (4) (5) No(2) "Looking "Looking addi-
(1) Nurses (3) for a for tional
Psychia- and Faculty psychia- an com-
trists attendants trist" internist" ment
Responses
Moves on,
head averted (%) 71 88 0 0 0 0
Makes eye contact (%) 23 10 0 11 0 0
Pauses and chats (%) 2 2 0 11 0 10
Stops and talks (%) 4 0.5 100 78 100 90
Mean number of questions
answered (out of 6) * * 6 3.8 4.8 4.5
Respondents (No.) 13 47 14 18 15 10
Attempts (No.) 185 1283 14 18 15 10
* Not applicable.
The encounter frequently took the following bizarre form:
(pseudopatient) "Pardon me, Dr. X. Could you tell me when I
am eligible for grounds privileges?" (physician) "Good morning,
Dave. How are you today?" (Moves off without waiting for a
response.)
It is instructive to compare these data with data recently ob-
tained at Stanford University. It has been alleged that large and
eminent universities are characterized by faculty who are so busy
that they have no time for students. For this comparison, a young
lady approached individual faculty members who seemed to be
walking purposefully to some meeting or teaching engagement and
asked them the following six questions.
1) "Pardon me, could you direct me to Encina Hall?" (at
the medical school: ". . . to the Clinical Research Center?").
1973]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
2) "Do you know where Fish Annex is?" (there is no Fish
Annex at Stanford).
3) "Do you teach here?"
4) "How does one apply for admission to the college?" (at
the medical school: ". . . to the medical school?").
5) "It it difficult to get in?"
6) "Is there financial aid?"
Without exception, as can be seen in Table 1 (column 3),
all of the questions were answered. No matter how rushed they
were, all respondents not only maintained eye contact, but stopped
to talk. Indeed, many of the respondents went out of their way
to direct or take the questioner to the office she was seeking, to try
to locate "Fish Annex," or to discuss with her the possibilities of
being admitted to the university.
Similar data, also shown in Table 1 (columns 4, 5, and 6),
were obtained in the hospital. Here too, the young lady came
prepared with six questions. After the first question, however, she
remarked to 18 of her respondents (column 4), "I'm looking for
a psychiatrist," and to 15 others (column 5), "I'm looking for an
internist." Ten other respondents received no inserted comment
(column 6). The general degree of cooperative responses is con-
siderably higher for these university groups than it was for pseudo-
patients in psychiatric hospitals. Even so, differences are apparent
within the medical school setting. Once having indicated that she
was looking for a psychiatrist, the degree of cooperation elicited
was less than when she sought an internist.
POWERLESSNESS AND DEPERSONALIZATION
Eye contact and verbal contact reflect concern and individua-
tion; their absence, avoidance and depersonalization. The data I
have presented do not do justice to the rich daily encounters that
grew up around matters of depersonalization and avoidance. I
have records of patients who were beaten by staff for the sin of
having initiated verbal contact. During my own experience, for
example, one patient was beaten in the presence of other patients
for having approached an attendant and told him, "I like you."
Occasionally, punishment meted out to patients for misdemeanors
seemed so excessive that it could not be justified by the most radi-
cal interpretations of psychiatric canon. Nevertheless, they ap-
peared to go unquestioned. Tempers were often short. A patient
who had not heard a call for medication would be roundly excori-
ated, and the morning attendants would often wake patients with,
"Come on, you m. f s, out of bed!"
Neither anecdotal nor "hard" data can convey the overwhelm-
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ing sense of powerlessness which invades the individual as he is
continually exposed to the depersonalization of the psychiatric hos-
pital. It hardly matters which psychiatric hospital-the excellent
public ones and the very plush private hospital were better than
the rural and shabby ones in this regard, but, again, the features
that psychiatric hospitals had in common overwhelmed by far their
apparent differences.
Powerlessness was evident everywhere. The patient is de-
prived of many of his legal rights by dint of his psychiatric com-
mitment. 2 He is shorn of credibility by virtue of his psychiatric
label. His freedom of movement is restricted. He cannot initiate
contact with the staff, but may only respond to such overtures as
they make. Personal privacy is minimal. Patient quarters and
possessions can be entered and examined by any staff member, for
whatever reason. His personal history and anguish is available to
any staff member (often including the "grey lady" and "candy
striper" volunteer) who chooses to read his folder, regardless of
their therapeutic relationship to him. His personal hygiene and
waste evacuation are often monitored. The water closets may
have no doors.
At times, depersonalization reached such proportions that
pseudopatients had the sense that they were invisible, or at least
unworthy of account. Upon being admitted, I and other pseudo-
patients took the initial physical examinations in a semipublic
room, where staff members went about their own business as if
we were not there.
On the ward, attendants delivered verbal and occasionally
serious physical abuse to patients in the presence of other observing
patients, some of whom (the pseudopatients) were writing it all
down. Abusive behavior, on the other hand, terminated quite
abruptly when other staff members were known to be coming.
Staff are credible witnesses. Patients are not.
A nurse unbuttoned her uniform to adjust her brassiere in the
presence of an entire ward of viewing men. One did not have the
sense that she was being seductive. Rather, she didn't notice us.
A group of staff persons might point to a patient in the dayroom
and discuss him animatedly, as if he were not there.
One illuminating instance of depersonalization and invisibil-
ity occurred with regard to medications. All told, the pseudopa-
tients were administered nearly 2100 pills, incuding Elavil, Stela-
zine, Compazine, and Thorazine, to name but a few. (That such
a variety of medications should have been administered to patients
21. D.B. Wexler & S.E. Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric Jus-
tice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1971).
1973]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
presenting identical symptoms is itself worthy of note.) Only two
were swallowed. The rest were either pocketed or deposited in
the toilet. The pseudopatients were not alone in this. Although
I have no precise records on how many patients rejected their
medications, the pseudopatients frequently found the medications
of other patients in the toilet before they deposited their own. As
long as they were cooperative, their behavior and the pseudopa-
tients' own in this matter, as in other important matters, went
unnoticed throughout.
Reactions to such depersonalization among pseudopatients
were intense. Although they had come to the hospital as partici-
pant observers and were fully aware that they did not "belong,"
they nevertheless found themselves caught up in and fighting the
process of depersonalization. Some examples: a graduate student
in psychology asked his wife to bring his textbooks to the hospital
so he could "catch up on his homework"--this despite the elabo-
rate precautions taken to conceal his professional association. The
same student, who had trained for quite some time to get into the
hospital, and who had looked forward to the experience, "remem-
bered" some drag races that he had wanted to see on the weekend
and insisted that he be discharged by that time. Another pseudo-
patient attempted a romance with a nurse. Subsequently, he in-
formed the staff that he was applying for admission to graduate
school in psychology and was very likely to be admitted, since a
graduate professor was one of his regular hospital visitors. The
same person began to engage in psychotherapy with other patients
-all of this as a way of becoming a person in an impersonal envi-
ronment.
THE SOURCES OF DEPERSONALIZATION
What are the origins of depersonalization? I have already
mentioned two. First are attitudes held by all of us toward the
mentally ill-including those who treat them-attitudes character-
ized by fear, distrust, and horrible expectations on the one hand,
and benevolent intentions on the other. Our ambivalence leads,
in this instance as in others, to avoidance.
Second, and not entirely separate, the hierarchical structure
of the psychiatric hospital facilitates depersonalization. Those
who are at the top have least to do with patients, and their behav-
ior inspires the rest of the staff. Average daily contact with psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, residents, and physicians combined ranged
from 3.9 to 25.1 minutes, with an overall mean of 6.8 (six pseudo-
patients over a total of 129 days of hospitalization). Included in
this average are time spent in the admissions interview, ward meet-
ings in the presence of a senior staff member, group and individual
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psychotherapy contacts, case presentation conferences, and dis-
charge meetings. Clearly, patients do not spend much time in in-
terpersonal contact with doctoral staff. And doctoral staff serve
as models for nurses and attendants.
There are probably other sources. Psychiatric installations
are presently in serious financial straits. Staff shortages are per-
vasive, staff time at a premium. Something has to give, and that
something is patient contact. Yet, while financial stresses are real-
ities, too much can be made of them. I have the impression that
the psychological forces that result in depersonalization are much
stronger than the fiscal ones and that the addition of more staff
would not correspondingly improve patient care in this regard.
The incidence of staff meetings and the enormous amount of rec-
ord-keeping on patients, for example, have not been as substan-
tially reduced as has patient contact. Priorities exist, even during
hard times. Patient contact is not a significant priority in the
traditional psychiatric hospital, and fiscal pressures do not account
for this. Avoidance and depersonalization may.
Heavy reliance upon psychotropic medication tacitly contrib-
utes to depersonalization by convincing staff that treatment is in-
deed being conducted and that further patient contact may not be
necessary. Even here, however, caution needs to be exercised in
understanding the role of psychotropic drugs. If patients were
powerful rather than powerless, if they were viewed as interesting
individuals rather than diagnostic entities, if they were socially sig-
nificant rather than social lepers, if their anguish truly and wholly
compelled our sympathies and concerns, would we not seek con-
tact with them, despite the availability of medications? Perhaps
for the pleasure of it all?
THE CONSEQUENCES OF LABELING AND DEPERSONALIZATION
Whenever the ratio of what is known to what needs to be
known approaches zero, we tend to invent "knowledge" and as-
sume that we understand more than we actually do. We seem
unable to acknowledge that we simply don't know. The needs for
diagnosis and remediation of behavioral and emotional problems
are enormous. But rather than acknowledge that we are just em-
barking on understanding, we continue to label patients "schizo-
phrenic," "manic-depressive," and "insane," as if in those words
we had captured the essence of understanding. The facts of the
matter are that we have known for a long time that diagnoses are
often not useful or reliable, but we have nevertheless continued to
use them. We now know that we cannot distinguish insanity from
sanity. It is depressing to consider how that information will be
used.
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Not merely depressing, but frightening. How many people,
one wonders, are sane but not recognized as such in our psychiat-
ric institutions? How many have been needlessly stripped of their
privileges of citizenship, from the right to vote and drive to that
of handling their own accounts? How many have feigned insanity
in order to avoid the criminal consequences of their behavior, and,
conversely, how many would rather stand trial than live intermina-
bly in a psychiatric hospital-but are wrongly thought to be men-
tally ill? How many have been stigmatized by well-intentioned,
but nevertheless erroneous, diagnoses? On the last point, recall
again that a "type 2 error" in psychiatric diagnosis does not have
the same consequences it does in medical diagnosis. A diagnosis
of cancer that has been found to be in error is cause for celebra-
tion. But psychiatric diagnoses are rarely found to be in error.
The label sticks, a mark of inadequacy forever.
Finally, how many patients might be "sane" outside the psy-
chiatric hospital but seem insane in it-not because craziness re-
sides in them, as it were, but because they are responding to a
bizarre setting, one that may be unique to institutions which harbor
nether people? Goffman2 2 calls the process of socialization to
such institutions "mortification"-an apt metaphor that includes
the processes of depersonalization that have been described here.
And while it is impossible to know whether the pseudopatients' re-
sponses to these processes are characteristic of all inmates-they
were, after all, not real patients-it is difficult to believe that these
processes of socialization to a psychiatric hospital provide useful
attitudes or habits of response for living in the "real world."
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane
in psychiatric hospitals. The hospital itself imposes a special envi-
ronment in which the meanings of behavior can easily be mis-
understood. The consequences to patients hospitalized in such an
environment-the powerlessness, depersonalization, segregation,
mortification, and self-labeling-seem undoubtedly counterther-
apeutic.
I do not, even now, understand this problem well enough to
perceive solutions. But two matters seem to have some promise.
The first concerns the proliferation of community mental health
facilities, of crisis intervention centers, of the human potential
movement, and of behavior therapies that, for all of their own
problems, tend to avoid psychiatric labels, to focus on specific
problems and behaviors, and to retain the individual in a relatively
22. See GOFFMAN, supra note 3.
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nonpejorative environment. Clearly, to the extent that we refrain
from sending the distressed to insane places, our impressions of
them are less likely to be distorted. (The risk of distorted percep-
tions, it seems to me, is always present, since we are much more
sensitive to an indivdual's behaviors and verbalizations than we
are to the subtle contextual stimuli that often promote them. At
issue here is a matter of magnitude. And, as I have shown, the
magnitude of distortion is exceedingly high in the extreme context
that is a psychiatric hospital.)
The second matter that might prove promising speaks to the
need to increase the sensitivity of mental health workers and re-
searchers to the Catch 22 position of psychiatric patients. Simply
reading materials in this area will be of help to some such workers
and researchers. For others, directly experiencing the impact of
psychiatric hospitalization will be of enormous use. Clearly, fur-
ther research into the social psychology of such total institutions
will both facilitate treatment and deepen understanding.
I and the other pseudopatients in the psychiatric setting had
distinctly negative reactions. We do not pretend to describe the
subjective experiences of true patients. Theirs may be different
from ours, particularly with the passage of time and the necessary
process of adaptation to one's environment. But we can and do
speak to the relatively more objective indices of treatment within
the hospital. It could be a mistake, and a very unfortunate one,
to consider that what happened to us derived from malice or
stupidity on the part of the staff. Quite the contrary, our over-
whelming impression of them was of people who really cared, who
were committed and who were uncommonly intelligent. Where
they failed, as they sometimes did painfully, it would be more
accurate to attribute those failures to the environment in which
they, too, found themselves than to personal callousness. Their
perceptions and behavior were controlled by the situation, rather
than being motivated by a malicious disposition. In a more benign
environment, one that was less attached to global diagnosis, their
behaviors and judgments might have been more benign and effec-
tive.23
23. I thank W. Mischel, E. Orne, and M.S. Rosenhan for comments on an
earlier draft of this manuscript.
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